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The Disaggregated State in Transnational 
Environmental Regulation 
Hoi L. Kong* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues against a positivist view of international environ-
mental law that (i) conceives of states as unitary entities that speak with one 
voice in pursuit of a single national interest,1 and that focuses on (ii) authori-
tative sources of law and (iii) the binding force of these sources of law.  Fur-
ther, this Article  argues for a view of transnational law that (i) views the state 
as disaggregated, rather than unitary, (ii) focuses on informal legal mecha-
nisms that do not have authoritative status and (iii) directs attention towards 
law’s facilitative functions and away from law’s binding force.  This special 
issue’s theme of transnational administrative law is specifically addressed by 
looking at a case study of transnational regulation, and an examination of the 
antecedents for this form of regulation in the administrative structures of Ca-
nadian federalism.  But first, a point about terminology.  
“International environmental law” is typically categorized as a subset of 
public international law, which is “a body of law created by nation states for 
nation states, to govern problems that arise between nation states.”2  Interna-
tional environmental law is further typically defined in terms of its authorita-
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University’s Lauterpacht Centre for International Law.  I am particularly grateful to 
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project.  I gratefully acknowledge the financial support provide by Hydro Québec, the 
Research Office of the Faculty of Law, McGill University, and the Secrétariat aux 
affaires intergouvernementales canadiennes.       
 1. For the concept of a unitary state, see ANNE MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
WORLD ORDER 32 (2004).  She writes that a unitary state is understood to be “repre-
sented by the head of state and the foreign minister, represented in other countries and 
international organizations by professional diplomats.  These representatives, in turn, 
purportedly articulate and pursue a single national interest.”  Id.  
 2. LAKSHMAN GURUSWAMY & BRENT HENDRICKS, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (1997).  Authors note that public interna-
tional law governs international organizations and non-state actors, as well as states.  
See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 124 
(2d ed. 2003).   
1
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tive binding sources3 and the subject matter it regulates, namely the environ-
ment.4  In this Article, I use the term “transnational environmental law” to 
denote the body of law that regulates environmental matters that lie beyond 
the capacity of individual states to regulate.  This body of law is not necessar-
ily created by states acting as unitary entities, nor does it necessarily regulate 
such states.       
This Article analyzes a particular administrative form of transnational 
environmental law that arises from interactions among sub-national units and 
draws on three bodies of literature: transnational network theory, global ad-
ministrative law, and theories of federalism.  These bodies of theoretical writ-
ing are drawn upon in order to demonstrate that transnational environmental 
regulation can involve disaggregated, rather than unitary states, as well as 
regulatory instruments that have neither an authoritative source nor binding 
effects; this form of transnational administrative regulation can further be 
explained in non-positivist and federalist terms.  The Article aims to make 
two main contributions.  First, through a discussion of concrete examples, it 
aims to illustrate and refine the theories it applies.  Second, the Article aims 
to demonstrate that the dominant positivist conception of international envi-
ronmental law is incomplete.  In particular, the Article argues that a non-
positivist theory of transnational environmental regulation that draws on 
transnational network theory, global administrative law, and theories of fed-
eralism can account for forms of transnational environmental regulation that 
the dominant positivist conception of environmental regulation is incapable 
of adequately explaining.    
Before engaging the main arguments of this paper, the theories upon 
which this Article draws are briefly outlined and the contrast between these 
theories and a positivist view of international law will be highlighted.  The 
following paragraphs will indicate how the literature on transnational network 
theory and global administrative law contrast with elements of the positivist 
view of international law, and how the literature on environmental federalism 
  
 3. The standard enumeration of the sources of international law is found in 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.  See Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).  In 
addition to these binding sources of authority, international environmental law is 
governed by soft-law or non-binding agreements that are lower on the hierarchy of 
sources, and that are similar to the instruments that we will examine in Part III.  See 
ULRICH BEYERLIN & THILO MARAUHN, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 291-
94 (2011).  It is worth noting, however, that while the soft-law is normally understood 
to consist of arrangements between states that have the capacity to enter into formal 
legal agreements, the arrangements described in Part III arise between entities that do 
not have this capacity.  The arrangements in Part III resemble Memoranda of Under-
standing (MOU) that are entered into by institutional actors that do not have the ca-
pacity to engage in treaty-making.  Id. at 294.  For a discussion of such MOU’s and 
examples of them, see id. at 294-95.   
 4. For various definitions of the “environment” in international law, see SANDS, 
supra note 2, at 15-18. 
2
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and non-positivist federalism can be interpreted to contrast with the positivist 
view.   
First, consider transnational network theory, whose proponents argue 
that relationships among states are increasingly shaped by interactions among 
actors from various states who work within the legislative, adjudicative and 
administrative branches of their respective states, and in particular, in regula-
tory agencies.5  These emerging regulatory networks displace the form of 
international cooperation that Professor Kal Raustiala has called “liberal in-
ternationalism”, which is “[b]ased on multilateral treaties, often coupled with 
international organizations[.]”6  The liberal internationalist vision of interna-
tional cooperation can be characterized as positivist because it rests on a vol-
untarist theory, in which international law is understood to emanate from the 
sovereign will of states.  This voluntarist theory presupposes a general posi-
tivist conception of law, in which a law is valid only if it represents an exer-
cise of a state’s sovereign will.7  Network theorists challenge the liberal inter-
nationalist view of international relations.  According to Professor Anne-
Marie Slaughter, a network conception of international relations sees  
a world of governments, with all the different institutions that per-
form the basic functions of government – legislation, adjudication, 
implementation – interacting both with each other domestically 
and also with their foreign and supranational counterparts.8 
Raustiala points out that these networks, which are comprised of the dis-
aggregated elements of various states, can at times make the implementation 
of treaties more effective and can facilitate negotiations over treaties.9  
Moreover, Raustiala makes a claim that is particularly pertinent for this paper 
when he writes that “where treaties are politically or economically precluded” 
these networks can “provide an alternative mode of cooperation.”10  There-
fore, the network theory of transnational regulation, and specifically 
Raustiala’s interpretation of the theory, is a counterpoint to a positivist con-
ception of international law.  Instead of focusing exclusively on acts of sover-
eign will by unitary states or on formal legal artifacts such as treaties, net-
work theory analyzes relationships and interactions among actors within dif-
  
 5. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgov-
ernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3-4 
(2002). 
 6. Id. at 2. 
 7. For a summary of this position in international law and an analysis of its 
antecedents in theories of domestic law, see Mehrdad Payandeh, The Concept of In-
ternational Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 967, 970-71 
(2010). 
 8. SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 5. 
 9. Raustiala, supra note 5, at 6. 
 10. Id.  
3
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ferent states and highlights the normative force of interactions among regula-
tors of different states that do not necessarily involve formal international 
law.11   
The writing on global administrative law is the second body of literature 
upon which this Article draws.  As do network theorists, authors writing on 
global administrative law reject positivist theories which claim that the sover-
eign will of unitary states is the ultimate source of validity for international 
law.  Professor Benedict Kingsbury argues:  
Instead of neatly separated levels of regulation (private, local, na-
tional, inter-state), a congeries of different actors and different lay-
ers together form a variegated ‘global administrative space’ that 
includes international institutions and transnational networks, as 
well as domestic administrative bodies that operate within interna-
tional regimes or cause transboundary regulatory effects.12  
Kingsbury adds to this disaggregated conception of the state a particular 
view of transnational law.  As mentioned above, Raustiala sees networks as 
complementing and supplementing formal international law, as defined by the 
liberal internationalist paradigm.13  Kingsbury goes further. He claims that 
“global administrative law” consists of “shared sets of norms and norm-
guided practices that are in some cases regarded as obligatory, and in many 
cases are given some weight, even when they are not obviously part of na-
tional (state) law or standard inter-state law.”14  Kingsbury’s claim rests on a 
distinctive conception of law, which does not understand the norms and prac-
tices that “are not obviously part of national (state) law or standard inter-state 
law” to be supplements or non-legal alternatives to international law. 
Kingsbury rather argues that these norms and practices can themselves be a 
form of law.  In order to arrive at this conclusion he draws on Lon L. Fuller’s 
jurisprudence concerning the rule of law.15   
According to Kingsbury, a norm or practice in the global administrative 
law context does not necessarily become law because it emanates from an 
authoritative source, such as the sovereign wills of states.16  Instead, 
Kingsbury argues that a norm or practice becomes law by virtue of the fact 
that it satisfies the normative requirements of “publicness” and Kingsbury 
  
 11. For a pluralist view of international law that similarly de-centers formal 
sources and structures of international law, see NICO KRISCH, BEYOND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW 60-103 
(2010). 
 12. Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 25 (2009) [hereinafter Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law]. 
 13. See notes 8-10 and accompanying text.  
 14. Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law, supra note 12, at 26.   
 15. See id. at 38-41. 
 16. Id. at 40. 
4
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draws on Fuller’s conception of the rule of law to make this argument.17 Ac-
cording to Kingsbury, the norms and practices of global administrative law 
satisfy the requirements of “publicness” even if they have not been authorized 
or delegated by states,18 and Kingsbury sets out an indicative list of principles 
that gives specific content to this general idea of publicness, in much the 
same way that Fuller sets out a set of indicia that give specific content to his 
idea of the rule of law.19  Kingsbury argues that these principles have the 
effect of “channeling, managing, shaping and constraining political power.”20   
Whereas a positivist conception of international law focuses on the bind-
ing effects of law, the Fullerian conception upon which Kingsbury draws 
focuses instead on law’s capacity to facilitate the pursuit of the public good 
by those publics who are affected by global administrative law.21  The rele-
vant publics include (i) “global administrative public entities (apart from 
states)[,]”22 (ii) “states and agencies of a particular state[,]”23 and (iii) “indi-
viduals and other private actors.”24  The practices and norms of the institu-
tions in the Canadian examples and the transnational case study evince this 
Fullerian conception of law, and the transnational case study provides an 
example of Kingsbury’s conception of global administrative law.  These in-
stances of regulation exhibit the facilitative functions of Fuller’s jurispruden-
tial theory and do not have the kinds of binding effect that some positivists 
would understand to be a necessary feature of all law, including international 
law.25 
  
 17. Id. at 30-31.  Kingsbury directly links his conception of global administrative 
law to Fuller’s ideas about the “inner morality of law.”  Id. at 38-39 (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).  
 18. Id. at 40. 
 19. Id. at 32.  The list includes the principles of legality, rationality, proportional-
ity, the rule of law and human rights. Id. at 32-33.   
 20. Id. at 32. 
 21. Id. at 39-40.  On this difference in emphasis, see Benedict Kingsbury, Legal 
Positivism as Normative Politics: International Society, Balance of Power and Lassa 
Oppenheim’s Positive International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401, 424-25 (2002) 
[hereinafter Kingsbury, Legal Positivism]. 
 22. Kingsbury, Global Administrative Law, supra note 12, at 26.  Kingsbury 
gives as an example of such an entity the World Trade Organization.  Id.  
 23. Id. at 37. 
 24. Id.  For an analysis of Fuller that understands the facilitative function to be 
central to his conception of law, see KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: 
RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L. FULLER (2012).   
 25. I am aware that such an essentially “command theory” of international law is 
not accepted by all international law positivists.  For a description of the command 
theory, see Payandeh, supra note 7, at 969-70.  For normative accounts of positivism 
that do not rest on such a command theory, see, e.g., id.; Kingsbury, Legal Positivism, 
supra note 21.  However, whether one views international law as conforming to the 
command theory or the more sophisticated versions of international law positivism, it 
remains the case that authors typically define international law, generally and interna-
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The third body of literature on which this paper draws is the theoretical 
writing on environmental and non-positivist federalism.  This Article refers to 
the recent work of Professor Wallace Oates in order to examine the condi-
tions under which actors within a federation will regulate environmental 
problems.26  Oates’ model presupposes a positivist conception of federalism.  
In this conception, federations are understood to be created by entrenched 
constitutions that authoritatively delineate the spheres of authority of the or-
ders of government.  In some accounts, the legally binding nature of a consti-
tution’s division of powers provisions is essential to securing goals associated 
with federalism, including those that relate to the capacity of sub-federal units 
to function as “alternative locations of independently derived government 
power.”27   
This Article argues that Oates’ model can be extended to a non-
positivist theory of federalism that can in turn be applied to the transnational 
context.  Professor Iris Marion Young argued in favor of a conception of fed-
eralism, whose non-positivist features include the fact that it does not rely on 
sharply and authoritatively defined jurisdictional boundaries.28  She called 
this conception “regional federalism” and applied it to metropolitan regions.29  
The fluidity of boundaries implied by this conception of federalism is evident 
in Young’s claim that “[t]he scope of a polity . . . ought to coincide with the 
scope of the obligations of justice which people have in relation to one an-
other because their lives are intertwined in social, economic and communica-
tive relations that tie their fates.”30  Although the specifics of Young’s model 
of federalism need not be discussed here, what is of particular interest is her 
  
tional environmental law in particular, in terms of their binding effects.  See, e.g., 
SANDS, supra note 2, at 12.  In this standard view, international law, in its legislative 
function creates “legal principles and rules which impose binding obligations requir-
ing states and other members of the international community to conform to certain 
norms of behaviour.”  Id.  The administrative function of international law involves 
the application of these principles and norms.  Id. at 12-13.    
 26. WALLACE E. OATES, A Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: SELECTED ESSAYS OF WALLACE 
E. OATES 125 (2004). 
 27. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2218-19 (1998).  Professor Jackson argues 
against authors who, according to her, “undervalue the role that the constitutional 
status of states may play in maintaining political stability.”  Id. at 2182; see also Jacob 
T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POLITICAL 
SCI. REV. 459, 475 (2007).  For an argument that frames the value of constitutionally 
entrenched federalism arrangements in terms of the norm of non-interference, see 
Jacob T. Levy, Self-determination, Non-domination, and Federalism, 23 HYPATIA 60, 
68 (2008).   
 28. See generally IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 198, 267 
(2000). 
 29. Id. at 198. 
 30. Id. at 228. 
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argument in favor of political institutions in metropolitan regimes that facili-
tate interactions and negotiations among local governments in metropolitan 
regions.31  Unlike positivist account of federalism, the focus in Young’s ac-
count was not on constitutionally entrenched jurisdictional boundaries or 
subject matter limitations.  Rather, she emphasized institutions that facilitate 
interactions among governments in territories and over subject matters whose 
limits are defined by the shared interests of citizens, rather than by authorita-
tive and binding legal instruments such as constitutions.  If extended to the 
transnational context and coupled with Oates’ theory of environmental feder-
alism, Young’s account can counter a positivist view of international envi-
ronmental law that relies on fixed and authoritatively defined jurisdictional 
boundaries.    
This Article draws on these bodies of theoretical writing on transna-
tional network theory, global administrative law and non-positivist and envi-
ronmental federalism in order to demonstrate that transnational environmental 
regulation can involve disaggregated, rather than unitary states, as well as 
regulatory instruments that have neither an authoritative source nor binding 
effects.  This form of transnational administrative regulation can further be 
explained in non-positivist federalist terms.  In order to provide background 
for this argument, Part II describes developments in Canadian administrative 
federalism.  This description will (i) illustrate how administrative federalism 
functions in a domestic setting, (ii) highlight aspects of the theories surveyed 
above, and (iii) situate administrative federalism and those theories in the 
context of standard administrative law debates.  Part III, examines Oakes’ 
writing on environmental regulation in the federalism context and demon-
strates how administrative regulation in the Canadian federation can illustrate 
Oakes’ model and suggest refinements to it.  Part IV examines a specific 
transnational administrative institution and shows how it can be interpreted to 
further extend Oakes’ model to a non-positivist and transnational form of 
administrative federalism that is similar to the Canadian form.  
This case study aims to provide support for a general theory of transna-
tional administrative law that advances the non-positivist trends in the trans-
national network theory, global administrative law, and federalism literatures 
surveyed above.  I begin by describing how the practices and institutions of 
Canadian administrative federalism reflect the concerns of the literatures 
summarized above, as well as general themes in administrative law scholar-
ship.     
  
 31. Id. at 232-33. 
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II.  THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES OF COOPERATIVE 
FEDERALISM: A DOMESTIC ANTECEDENT TO THE TRANSNATIONAL 
CASE 
Scholars of Canadian federalism have noted that in the past three dec-
ades, across a range of regulatory fields, it is in the interactions between ad-
ministrative agencies that the greatest innovations in cooperation among the 
federal and provincial governments have been undertaken.  These innovations 
are called administrative federalism.  In part, the cooperation has arisen be-
cause avenues for constitutional change have been closed due to some highly 
visible and politically costly failed attempts at amending the Canadian Con-
stitution.32  Canada provides a particularly good case study for administrative 
federalism because political actors were highly motivated to innovate due to 
these failures at constitutional reform.   This section aims to demonstrate that 
the Canadian regulatory state has introduced sub-constitutional, administra-
tive innovations to how the different orders of government interact and in the 
regulatory instruments they use.  These innovations evidence a willingness on 
the part of governments to deploy a range of regulatory forms in the pursuit 
of varied regulatory values; they evidence an acknowledgment that regulatory 
problems cross jurisdictional and departmental boundaries; and they demon-
strate a willingness to use information-pooling mechanisms to draw together 
a variety of stakeholders in common purpose.  Several features of this evolu-
tion in the federal administrative state illustrate elements of the literatures 
surveyed above and reflect the concerns of administrative law theorists. 
Consider four points of overlap between changes in Canadian adminis-
trative federalism and the sets of literatures surveyed above.  First, the 
changes have occurred at all levels of federal and provincial governance prac-
tice.  In addition to summits among first ministers, there have been introduced 
meetings among ministers with similar portfolios (i.e., ministers of health), as 
well as meetings of officials from all orders of government who share prac-
tices and experiences.33  Administrative federalism in Canada, like the net-
works analyzed by transnational network theory, reflects a disaggregated 
image of the state and sub-national state units in which regulators working 
across jurisdictional boundaries play a particularly significant role.  Second, 
the evolution in Canadian administrative federalism has involved a range of 
regulatory instruments, including intergovernmental agreements, block and 
individual transfers of funds from the federal to the provincial governments 
  
 32. For this diagnosis of the evolution of cooperative federalism, see generally 
Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effective-
ness and Legitimacy, in CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PERFORMANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND 
LEGITIMACY (Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad, eds., 2002).   
 33. Id. at 8. 
8
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and individual citizens, and jointly constituted administrative bodies.34  These 
diverse regulatory instruments, which aim to respond to diverse sets of pub-
lics within the Canadian federation, resemble the kinds of regulatory instru-
ments that Kingsbury describes in his account of global administrative law.  
Third, representatives of the relevant communities of interests gather to dis-
cuss common concerns in institutions that resemble the ones prescribed by 
Young’s non-positivist conception of federalism.  Fourth, the evolving in-
struments of Canadian administrative federalism reflect a variety of values 
that have significance for theories of federalism, including the theory of envi-
ronmental federalism articulated by Oates.  Specific instruments attempt to 
accommodate regional diversity, at the same time as they try to achieve regu-
latory coordination and set baseline national standards.   
In addition to echoing the concerns of the literature on transnational 
network theory, global administrative law and environmental and non-
positivist federalism, the regulatory instruments and institutions of Canadian 
administrative federalism reflect values that preoccupy administrative law 
theorists.  Consider the diversity of administrative structures available to the 
orders of government in the Canadian federation.  Governments sometimes 
deploy administrative structures that are directly under the line control of 
ministerial departments, and in which the possibility for political control and 
accountability is relatively high.  At other times, governments use arm’s 
length non-profit organizational structures in which the control and account-
ability runs from and to a council of ministers, rather than to a particular min-
ister.35  Sometimes governments will choose to regulate using agencies that 
fall under a single portfolio that calls upon the expertise of a single depart-
ment, while at other times they will use agencies that are cross-sectoral and 
call upon the expertise of several departments.36   
Each of these choices of administrative structure has implications for 
how governments within the Canadian federation will work together, and 
each attracts traditional concerns of administrative law theory about democ-
ratic controls on administrative actors, the expertise of administrative actors, 
and the degree of independence from political control that such actors need in 
order to be effective.37  Moreover, governments can deploy regulatory in-
  
 34. For a description of this range of instruments, see generally Carolyn M. 
Johns, Patricia L. O’Reilly & Gregory J. Inwood, Intergovernmental Innovation and 
the Administrative State in Canada, 19 GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & 
INSTITUTIONS 627 (2006).   
 35. For examples of these two institutional forms, see Bakvis & Skogstad, supra 
note 32. 
 36. For a discussion of these two agency forms and their implications for inter-
governmental relations, see J. Stefan Dupré, The Workability of Executive Federalism 
in Canada, in FEDERALISM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE 236, 240  (Herman Bakvis & 
William M. Chandler, eds., 1987). 
 37. For a standard treatment of such concerns in administrative law, see gener-
ally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002).   
9
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struments, including information databases, tax incentives, standards, pre-
scriptive regulations, and public-private partnerships with universities and 
community groups.38  This range of regulatory instruments evidences the 
claim made by administrative law scholars working in the instrument choice 
tradition that different kinds of instruments can be deployed by governments 
to respond to different kinds of regulatory problems.39     
An example from the past decade of federal-provincial cooperation will 
give a flavor of recent innovations in the Canadian administrative state that 
reflect the above trends in administrative federal governance.40  The 2003 
Accord on Health Care Renewal aimed to promote accountability and trans-
parency by establishing the Health Council of Canada as an independent body 
to inform Canadians about health care matters.41  In the 2004 Ten Year Plan, 
the First Ministers required annual public reports.42  The 2003 Accord out-
lined the nature of the Council, and stated, 
[t]he Health Council will publicly report through fed-
eral/provincial/territorial Ministers of Health and will include rep-
resentatives of both orders of government, experts and the public.  
To fulfill its mandate, the Council will draw upon consultations 
and relevant reports, including governments’ reports, the work of 
the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Advisory Committee on Govern-
ance and Accountability and the Canadian Institute for Health In-
formation (CIHI).43 
In the decade since its creation, the Council has fulfilled its mandate, as 
it has provided information to the public and to policy makers and govern-
  
 38. For a description of some innovative instruments that place the emphasis on 
citizen engagement, see Rod Dobell & Luc Bernier, Citizen-Centered Governance: 
Implications for Inter-Governmental Canada, in ALTERNATIVE SERVICE DELIVERY: 
SHARING GOVERNANCE IN CANADA 250 (Robin Ford & David Zussman, eds., 1997). 
 39. Roderick A. Macdonald, The Swiss Army Knife of Governance, in 
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE 203, 214-24 (Pearl 
Eliadis et al., eds., 2005). 
 40. This example is drawn from the discussion in HOI KONG, Section 36(1), New 
Governance Theory and the Spending Power in Canada, in OPEN FEDERALISM AND 
THE SPENDING POWER 193, 227-29 (2012). 
 41. 2003 First Ministers’ Accord on Health Care Renewal, HEALTH 
CANADA, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/2003accord 
/index-eng.php (last modified May 8, 2006) [hereinafter 2003 Accord]. 
 42. First Minister’s Meeting on the Future of Health Care 2004: A 10-year plan 
to strengthen health care, HEALTH CANADA (Sept. 16, 2004), http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/hcs-sss/delivery-prestation/fptcollab/2004-fmm-rpm/index-eng.php.  
 43. 2003 Accord, supra note 41. 
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ments about progress in health management and has identified best practices 
that have helped to shape innovative health policy.44 
This section hopes to have established that the Canadian regulatory state 
has introduced sub-constitutional, administrative innovations to how the dif-
ferent orders of government interact and in the regulatory instruments they 
use.  These innovations evidence a willingness on the part of governments to 
deploy a range of regulatory forms in the pursuit of varied regulatory values; 
they evidence an acknowledgment that regulatory problems cross jurisdic-
tional and departmental boundaries; and they demonstrate a willingness to use 
information-pooling mechanisms to draw together a variety of stakeholders in 
common purpose.  As discussed supra these developments in Canadian ad-
ministrative federalism reflect the concerns of authors writing on transna-
tional network theory, global administrative law and environmental and non-
positivist federalism.  Part IV explains that these Canadian developments can 
be considered antecedents of a transnational regulatory structure that aims to 
address environmental concerns.  But first, a discussion of how Oates’ theory 
of environmental federalism applies to the Canadian context and can both 
illustrate and refine that theory.   
III.  ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: GENERAL REGULATORY TRENDS 
IN CANADA 
This Part’s discussion of recent theoretical insights on environmental 
regulation in federations, and their application to the Canadian federation, 
will frame the case study in Part IV.  The scholarship on environmental regu-
lation in the federalism context has largely involved proponents and oppo-
nents of centralized regulation.  One particularly intense subset of the debate 
has addressed the question of whether decentralized regulation leads to a race 
to the bottom, in which sub-federal jurisdictions pursue policies that are 
harmful to the environment, in an attempt to lower the cost of operating busi-
nesses within their jurisdiction and to compete with other jurisdictions for 
businesses.  The evidence is mixed, with some scholars, perhaps most promi-
nently among them, Richard Revesz, noting that sub-federal jurisdictions 
have initiated some of the most innovative regulatory programs, in the ab-
sence of federal regulation.45  By contrast, Kirsten Engel, among others, has 
argued that the presence or absence of federal regulation is only one factor 
that motivates states to regulate, and Engel concludes that there is a prima 
  
 44. For a summary of the Council’s activities and a description of its structures 
and developing initiatives, see its strategic plan: HEALTH COUNCIL OF CANADA, 
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS 2011: FIVE-YEAR STRATEGIC PLAN (2011), http: 
//healthcouncilcanada.ca/tree/HCC_StratPlan2011_Final.pdf. 
 45. The classic article is Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competi-
tion: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). 
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facie case for the claim that races to the bottom will occur, in the absence of 
federal regulation of environmental issues.46   
In a significant recent contribution to the debate, Oates argues that it is 
important to separate analytically different kinds of environmental pollu-
tion.47  The analytical precision of Oates’ work illustrates when a race to the 
bottom is likely and what kinds of regulatory responses are necessary to ad-
dress specific kinds of environmental harms within federations.  Oates identi-
fies three cases of pollution in a federation.  The first involves a pure public 
good and in this case, a unit of polluting emission has the same effect on the 
direction of the quality of the national environment, irrespective of where that 
unit is emitted.  Examples of this kind of pollution include those that contrib-
ute to climate change and deplete the ozone layer.  The second case involves 
a pure local public good.  In this case, the effects of environmental pollution 
are felt exclusively in the jurisdiction where the pollution is emitted.  Exam-
ples of this kind of pollution include pollution of local drinking water sources 
and “the collection and disposal of local refuse.”  The third case of pollution 
involves spillover effects.  In this case, pollution in one jurisdiction has ef-
fects on neighboring jurisdictions, and includes situations of unidirectional 
flows, either downwind or down-water, as well spillovers that are reciprocal, 
as is the case when multiple jurisdictions share a body of water and relatively 
similar segments of their respective shorelines are exposed to pollutants that 
are emitted into the water by any one of the jurisdictions.  
According to Oates, different kinds of regulatory responses are effective 
for regulating the different cases of pollution.  For the first case of pollution, 
argues Oates, decentralized regulation is inefficient, as only centralized regu-
lation can respond to the aggregate harms that result from pollution emitted in 
multiple jurisdictions.  The second case is the one that typically gives rise to 
race to the bottom concerns.  Oates notes that there is at least one clear case 
when decentralized regulation is efficient: when the effects on present prop-
erty values of regulating the local sources of pollution are evident, known and 
positive.  If, however, decentralized regulation yields a race to the bottom, 
which creates significant inefficiencies, the question arises as to what the 
appropriate central government response might be and potential responses 
include subsidies and centralized directive regulation.  For the final case, 
involving interjurisdictional spillovers, the most efficient regulatory response 
involves cooperation among jurisdictions, and uniform centralized location is 
inefficient, argues Oates, because it will not account for local variations.  
Moreover, Oates suggests that the incentives for interjurisdictional coopera-
tion vary.  Jurisdictions are most incentivized to cooperate when the spill-
  
 46. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, Whither Subnational Climate Change Initiatives 
in the Wake of Federal Climate Legislation?, 39 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 432 (2009); 
Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It 
“To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 271 (1997). 
 47. OATES, supra note 26, 125-56. The two paragraphs in the main text follow-
ing this note summarize Oates’ argument in chapter 7. 
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overs are reciprocal and least incentivized when spillovers are unidirectional.  
Oates’ rubric for analyzing environmental regulation can be used to evaluate 
trends in Canadian environmental regulation.   
A.  Canadian Federalism Jurisprudence 
The general trend in Canadian federalism jurisprudence over the second 
half of the twentieth century and the early decades of this one has yielded a 
general expansion of the scope of federal jurisdiction across a host of subject 
matters and an increase in areas of jurisdictional overlap between the federal 
and provincial competences.48  This evolution of division of powers doctrine 
has had an effect on the instruments that governments have chosen in order to 
regulate environmental affairs.  Scholars note that for much of the twentieth 
century, federal jurisdiction was limited by a generally narrow reading of the 
federal powers that might bear on environmental matters, and as a conse-
quence, private law actions, which fall within exclusive provincial jurisdic-
tion, were the primary means of regulating environmental harms.49  Scholars 
further note that to the extent that the federal government was involved in 
environmental regulation, it tended to be in areas that fell under specific sub-
ject matters clearly within its jurisdiction, such as fisheries, rather than under 
open-ended powers to regulate the environment itself.50   
By the 1980’s and 90’s the Supreme Court of Canada developed doc-
trinal bases for broad federal jurisdiction over the environment, most notably 
under the open-ended criminal and peace, order and good government pow-
ers.51  Moreover, the Court expressly noted that the environment was an area 
of shared jurisdiction between the provinces and the federal government.52  
As authors have noted, these shifts in constitutional doctrine opened the way 
for both an increased federal presence in environmental regulation and greater 
cooperation among the federal government and the provinces in the regula-
tion of environmental issues.53  The regulatory means available to federal and 
  
 48. For one account of this history, describing recent developments, see Wade K. 
Wright, Facilitating Intergovernmental Dialogue: Judicial Review of the Division of 
Powers in the Supreme Court of Canada, 51 SUP. CT. L. REV. 625 (2010). 
 49. For an overview of these historical periods, see Michael Howlett & Sima 
Joshi-Koop, Canadian Environmental Politics and Policy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CANADIAN POLITICS 470, 474-77 (John C. Courtney & David E. Smith eds., 2010). 
 50. O.P. DWIVEDI ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND CANADA: NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 51 (2001). 
 51. See R. v. Hydro-Quebec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 (Can.); R. v. Crown Zellerbach 
Can. Ltd., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401 (Can.). 
 52. Friends of the Oldman River Soc’y v. Can. (Minister of Transp.),  [1992] 1 
S.C.R. 3 (Can.). 
 53. See, e.g., Mark S. Winfield, Environmental Policy and Federalism, in 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM: PERFORMANCE, EFFECTIVENESS, AND LEGITIMACY 124, 126 
(Herman Bakvis & Grace Skogstad eds., 2002). 
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provincial governments to regulate the environment have thus multiplied.  
Governments in Canada now have available to them the means necessary to 
regulate all three of Oates’ cases, and the ability to make the optimal regula-
tory choice in each case.  Further, the general trends in Canadian federal ad-
ministrative structures identified above are evidenced in Canadian environ-
mental regulatory choices.   
B.  Pure Public Goods Pollution 
Consider first the regulation of those kinds of pollution that Oates iden-
tifies as pure public goods.  As his classificatory scheme would suggest, the 
federal government has taken a role in the regulation of the relevant kinds of 
pollution, and as the administrative law theorists we have surveyed might 
predict, the regulatory choices in this and the second and third cases have 
demonstrated a willingness to deploy a range of regulatory instruments and 
involve a spectrum of stakeholders.  For instance, a Liberal government in 
2000 created an Action Plan on Climate Change that involved significant 
spending on programming that aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emission; in 
2002, Environment Canada released a greenhouse gas inventory that meas-
ured emissions against Canada’s international commitments to greenhouse 
gas reductions; and in 2005, the federal government entered into an agree-
ment with automakers that entailed voluntary commitments to lower green-
house gas emissions from automobiles.54  Yet, although the federal govern-
ment is in a better position to regulate these kinds of public goods, relative to 
the provinces, in recent years, the Conservative government has ratcheted 
back the federal role, backed off of international commitments and has ad-
vanced as one of its arguments for doing so the fact that Canadian initiatives 
would likely be futile and costly, in light of inaction by other countries.55  
Authors have argued that this re-entrenched federal role has opened policy 
space for sub-federal regulatory innovations in this area,56 and the next Part 
explains one transnational instance of such innovation.   
C.  Local Effects Pollution 
Consider now the second case of environmental regulation in a federa-
tion identified by Oates, namely that in which pollution has entirely local 
effects.  Oates’ model would suggest that in this case, the provinces should 
  
 54. Peter J. Stoett, Looking for Leadership: Canada and Climate Change Policy, 
in CHANGING CLIMATES IN NORTH AMERICAN POLITICS 47, 52 (Henrik Selin & Stacy 
D. VanDeveer eds., 2009). 
 55. Canada Pulls Out of Kyoto Protocol, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-
protocol. 
 56. Stoett, supra note 54, at 55. 
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take a lead role and that federal regulation would be inefficient.57  In this area, 
federal involvement has tended to be facilitative rather than directive. Under 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, Environment Canada estab-
lished, in consultation with industry actors, guidelines based on a “best prac-
ticable technology” approach, yet these guidelines have no legal force unless 
the provinces enact them.58  Such a regulatory approach seems consistent 
with Oates’ theory: because impacts of asphalt paving and cement plants (for 
instance) are overwhelmingly local, they fall within exclusive provincial ju-
risdiction, and it is therefore the primary responsibility of the provinces to 
regulate them.  Nonetheless, because the federal government has a superior 
capacity to gather information and to negotiate and interact with powerful 
industry actors, it retains a role in defining and making available best practice 
standards.   
D.  Spillover Pollution 
In the third and final case of environmental regulation that Oates identi-
fies – the case of spillovers59 – we see in the Canadian experience a signifi-
cant number of intergovernmental bodies that facilitate the kind of agree-
ments that Oates suggests are optimal regulatory instruments.  For example, 
in order to facilitate cooperation among the provinces, as well as between the 
provinces and the federal government, the Canadian Council of Ministers of 
the Environment adopted in 1988 a “Statement on Interjurisdictional Co-
operation on Environmental Matters” that included a commitment that gov-
ernments would work together to “harmonize environmental legislation, poli-
cies and programs across jurisdictions.”60  The Council was instrumental in 
facilitating negotiations among the federal and provincial governments that 
led to a Harmonization Accord in which all provinces (except Quebec) and 
the federal government  agreed to coordinate activities, publicize their work, 
and enter into sub-agreements.61  It is notable that some of the Council’s key 
initiatives, such as Canada-wide Acid Rain Strategy for Post-2000, target 
pollution that has spillover effects and whose patterns are not predictably 
unidirectional.62  
  
 57. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 58. DWIVEDI ET AL., supra note 50, at 128. 
 59. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 60. DWIVEDI ET AL., supra note 50, at 73.  
 61. For a description of the Council’s structure and its accomplishments, see 
CANADIAN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, A CANADA-WIDE ACCORD 
ON ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONIZATION, http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/accord 
_harmonization_e.pdf.  
 62. For the details of the strategy, see FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL/TERRITORIAL 
MINISTERS OF ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT, SUPPORTING DOCUMENT FOR THE 
CANADA-WIDE ACID RAIN STRATEGY FOR POST-2000 (1998) [hereinafter ACID RAIN 
STRATEGY], http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/1998_acid_rain_strategy_e.pdf. 
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In this category of regulatory initiatives, partial confirmation of Oates’ 
analysis of spillover effects can be seen.  As is consistent with his analysis, 
agreements among affected sub-federal units have been a primary regulatory 
instrument.  Yet, there has also been in this context a significant federal role, 
which suggests that a refinement to Oates’ model is in order.  Recall that he 
argues that uniform federal regulation would be suboptimal in this context, 
because it would not be able to take into consideration sub-federal varia-
tions.63  The Canadian experience suggests two adjustments to his analysis.  
First, the federal government can, in collaboration with affected provinces, 
play a role in defining regulatory strategies for regions within the country, 
such as the Southeast.  The federal government has a role to play because it 
has committed Canada to international standards, and because it can negotiate 
with other state actors, such as the United States, whose activities have a di-
rect impact on the Southeastern Canadian provinces most affected by sulfer 
dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions.64  Second, the federal government has 
a role to play in cases of spillovers, because certain sources of emissions fall 
within federal jurisdiction, and so it makes sense for the federal government 
to enter into agreements with a province, such as Ontario, in order to address 
emissions in the Great Lakes Basin.65  In short, in the case of spillover pollu-
tion in Canada that has regional effects, the federal government has a role to 
play, although Oates is correct to say that if the federal government were to 
enact uniform national standards, such standards would be inefficient because 
they would not take into consideration regional variations. 
E.  Conclusion 
This Part has shown how the Canadian experience with environmental 
regulation confirms Oates’ analysis of standard cases of pollution and the 
optimal regulatory responses to them and suggests refinements to that analy-
sis.  In what follows, the analyses that have been developed in this Part and 
the previous one will be applied to an instance of transnational environmental 
regulation.        
IV.  THE DISAGGREGATED STATE IN TRANSNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: THE EXAMPLE OF THE NEW 
ENGLAND GOVERNORS (NEG) AND EASTERN CANADIAN PREMIERS 
(ECP) 
This Part will show how a case of transnational environmental regula-
tion (i) illustrates and further refines Oates’ analysis of environmental feder-
  
 63. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 64. ACID RAIN STRATEGY, supra note 62, at 2, 5, 7.  For a description of some of 
these international commitments see DWIVEDI ET AL., supra note 50, at 107-12. 
 65. Id.  
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alism, and (ii) reflects the trends in Canadian administrative federalism, as 
well as the general concerns raised by the theorists surveyed in the Introduc-
tion and by administrative law theorists. The specific case study selected--the 
NEG-ECP annual conference—offers a strong counterpoint to the positivist 
conception of international environmental insofar as it involves neither uni-
tary states expressing national purposes nor authoritative sources of law that 
have binding effects.  Instead, the case study (i) represents disaggregated, 
rather than unitary states, (ii) focuses on informal legal mechanisms that do 
not have authoritative status and (iii) directs attention towards law’s facilita-
tive functions and away from law’s binding force.   
The NEG-ECP annual conference draws together two regional organiza-
tions – the Council of Atlantic Premiers and the New England Governors’ 
Conference – and comprises participants from six states (Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont) and five prov-
inces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island 
and Quebec).66  It was established in 1973,67 and the Conference has five 
main functions: “developing networks and relationships, taking collective 
action, engaging in regional projects and endorsing projects by others, under-
taking research, and increasing public awareness of shared interests.”68  Over 
its history, the NEG-ECP conference has addressed a wide range of areas of 
common interest, including issues of energy policy and concerns about acid 
rain and mercury pollution.69  According to Professor Debora VanNijnatten, 
although the premiers and governors meet at the annual conference, the real 
work is done by “mid-level officials and experts via collaborative research 
projects, joint seminars (often for training air quality officials in the two 
countries), and the preparation of policy papers.”70  The NEG-ECP confer-
ences have generated a variety of action plans, including the Joint Climate 
Change Action Plan in 2001, which set out the following nine actions and 
goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: (i) establish a regional standard-
ized greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions inventory, (ii) establish a plan for re-
ducing GHG emissions and conserving energy, (iii) promote public aware-
ness, (iv) state and provincial governments to lead by example, (v) reduce 
greenhouse gases from the electricity sector, (vi) reduce total energy demand 
through conservation, (vii) reduce and/or adapt to negative social, economic 
  
 66. Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer, Climate Leadership in Northeast North 
America, in CHANGING CLIMATES IN NORTH AMERICAN POLITICS, supra note 54, at 
111, 112-13. 
 67. Id.  For a history of the Conference, see ULRIKE RAUSCH, THE POTENTIAL OF 
TRANSBORDER COOPERATION: STILL WORTH A TRY? (1997). 
 68. New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers’ Annual Confer-
ence (NEG/ECP), COUNCIL OF ATLANTIC PREMIERS, http://www.cap-cpma.ca 
/default.asp?mn=1.98.3.26 (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Debora L. VanNijnatten, Analyzing the Canada-U.S. Environmental Rela-
tionship: A Multi-Faceted Approach, 33 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 93, 110 (2003). 
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and environmental impacts of climate change, (viii) decrease the transporta-
tion sector’s growth in GHG emissions,  and (ix) create a regional emissions 
registry and explore a trading mechanism.71   
In addition to bringing together the relevant political actors in order to 
formulate action plans, the NEG-ECP conference has created and drawn on a 
network of civil servants, universities, government agencies and private ac-
tors to support its activities.72  Scholars note that crown corporations and pri-
vate actors, in particular, have incentives to support regional environmental 
regulation.  For instance, Professors Selin and VanDeever note that Hydro 
Quebec can benefit from reductions in fossil fuel use in the region and own-
ers of power plants in particular New England States have incentives to en-
sure that regulatory measures undertaken by one state apply to competitors 
across the region.73  Moreover, one existing network upon which the NEG-
ECP drew for support was the Ouranos consortium, which is a collaboration 
among the Canadian government, provincial government actors (including 
Hydro Quebec), universities (including UQAM, Laval and McGill), and in-
dependent research institutions (including the Institut national de la recherche 
scientifique).74  The consortium focuses on the themes of Climate Sciences 
and Impacts and Adaptation and generates data on regional climate change 
that is useful to the NEG-ECP.75  Based on recent reports, the NEG-ECP ini-
tiatives have yielded tangible results.  In the most recent annual conference, it 
was reported that, based on available evidence “the region is likely to meet or 
exceed its GHG reduction target for 2010.”76 
The NEG-ECP conference confirms and extends the insights of transna-
tional network, global administrative law and non-positivist and environ-
mental theorists surveyed in this paper.  The NEG ECP also represents an 
extension into the transnational sphere of trends in domestic administrative 
federalism.  Consider first the fit between the insights of transnational net-
  
 71. NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS & EASTERN CANADIAN PREMIERS, CLIMATE 
CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2001 (2001), http://www.gov.ns.ca/nse/climate.change/docs 
/NEG-ECP.pdf. 
 72. For the interaction between Ouranos and the NEG-ECP, see Selin & Van-
Deever,  supra note 66, at 111, 113. 
 73. Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeever, Canadian-U.S. Environmental Coop-
eration: Climate Change Networks and Regional Action, 35 AM. REV. CAN. STUD. 
353, 364 (2005). 
 74. For a full list of Ouranos members, see Structure, OURANOS: CONSORTIUM 
ON REGIONAL CLIMATOLOGY & ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, http:/ 
/www.ouranos.ca/en/our-organisation/structure.php (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
 75. For a description of the consortium and its research mission, see Mission and 
Context, OURANOS: CONSORTIUM ON REGIONAL CLIMATOLOGY & ADAPTATION TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ouranos.ca/en/our-organisation/mission-and-context 
.php. 
 76. CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT, RESOLUTION 
35-5 RESOLUTION CONCERNING CLIMATE CHANGE (2011), http://www.scics 
.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a=viewdocument&id=1660.  
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work theory and the institutional arrangements of the NEG-ECP conference.  
The NEG-ECP conference is an example of the transnational network theo-
rist’s conception of the disaggregated state.  Recall that transnational network 
theorists argue that transnational relations are conducted between actors 
within the component elements of various states, and not only between repre-
sentatives, such as heads of states and foreign ministers, who claim to speak 
on behalf of the state as a whole.77  As seen above, network theorists place 
particular emphasis on networks of regulators.  In the NEG-ECP conference, 
it is not only actors within the legislative, adjudicative and administrative 
branches of various governments who are empowered to enter into treaties 
that conduct transnational relations.  The NEG-ECP conference provides 
examples of representatives of states and province who do not have the legal 
capacity to enter into treaties conducting transnational relations.  Moreover, 
the NEG-ECP conferences reach beyond the state to involve universities, 
actors in civil society and businesses in the task of regulating environmental 
issues of transnational significance.  The NEG-ECP conferences provide in-
stitutional examples of transnational regulation that does not rest on the posi-
tivist assumptions of liberal internationalism.  The conferences therefore fit 
into transnational network theory’s shift in focus away from conceiving inter-
national relations as exclusively comprised of exercises of the sovereign will 
of unitary state towards a more layered and nuanced view of international 
relations.   
The NEG-ECP conference also confirms the claims about the functions 
of transnational law made by global administrative law theorists.  Recall that 
global administrative law theorists shift attention away from the positivist’s 
focus on norms and practices that have binding force, towards the facilitative 
function of norms and practices that may not have binding legal effects.78  
According to Kingsbury, global administrative law addresses itself towards 
various publics and permits those publics to pursue the public good.79  The 
NEG-ECP conference fits this description of global administrative law.  It 
creates forums and mechanisms for publics, including provincial and state 
governments, the agencies of those governments, and civil society actors 
within the territory covered by the political boundaries of the NEG-ECP’s 
members. These various publics pursue through the NEG-ECP conferences 
their conception of the public good, including that element of the public good 
which is related to shared environmental concerns.80  Recall further that ac-
  
 77. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text. 
 78. Professor Kristen Engel argues that American states participating in regional 
networks are likely constitutionally precluded by the Commerce Clause from setting 
mandatory requirements and imposing them on one another.  Kirsten H. Engel, Miti-
gating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 55, 73, 77 (2005). 
 79. See supra notes 12-25 and accompanying text. 
 80. Professor Debora VanNijnatten has argued that the conference has “little 
actual decision-making power, but the group’s regular meetings have spawned con-
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cording to Kingsbury, global administrative law is valid law because it con-
forms with principles that have the effect of “channeling, managing, shaping 
and constraining political power.”81  Consider the principle of rationality, 
which according to Kingsbury puts “pressure on decision-makers (and in 
some countries, on rule-makers) to give reasons for their decisions.”82  Al-
though the NEG-ECP does not have a system of judicial review, which is a 
standard means of giving effect to the principle of rationality, it does create a 
system of accountability that places pressure on its members to give reasons 
for their actions.  The action plans generated at the conferences, along with 
the data produced by the Ouranos consortium, place pressure on the members 
of the NEG-ECP to justify the policy choices that bear on regional climate 
change.83  These informal mechanisms, therefore, can be conceived of as 
valid global administrative law, according to Kingsbury’s account, because 
they conform to the principle of rationality. 
The experience of the NEG-ECP suggests several possible refinements 
to the work of the federalism theorists considered in this Article and is consis-
tent with the domestic developments in administrative federalism surveyed 
above.  The NEG-ECP experience suggests that the federal role in environ-
mental regulation imagined by Oates can be overstated.  Oates presupposes 
that the federal government is always a significant player (whether through 
action or forebearance) in the regulation of matters affecting sub-federal ac-
tors.84  Yet the experience of the NEG-ECP shows us that an effective regula-
tory network can be constituted by sub-federal actors who are affected by a 
particular governance challenge and who have mutual interests in regulating a 
matter.  Far from being necessary to an effective solution to climate change, 
federal governments can be an impediment to such solutions.  Indeed, as 
scholars who have examined recent agreements among cities from across the 
globe have noted, the failure of nation states to coordinate effectively and 
sign treaties with respect to climate change, has led sub-national entities such 
as states, provinces and cities to enter into their own agreements.85  The 
NEG-ECP is one instance of this emerging trend, which suggests a challenge 
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to a positivist conception of federalism and support for non-positivist concep-
tions, such as Young’s.86  The coordinating function that federalism theorists 
imagine the federal government playing is filled instead by a collective body 
constituted by sub-federal actors of different federations.  This collective 
body further resembles the ones illustrated above in the discussion of Cana-
dian administrative federalism and is consistent with Young’s ideas about 
federalism and her institutional prescriptions.  Recall that Young argues that 
the relevant boundaries of her “regional federalism” should be defined by 
communities of interest rather than political borders and that she prescribes 
institutions within which the relevant interests could be discussed.87  The 
NEG-ECP represents a regional community of interest – one that is not 
bounded by the borders of United States and Canada – and it provides a fo-
rum for interested parties in the region to discuss matters of common concern, 
including those related to climate change.   
The experience of the NEG-ECP further suggests that Oates’ model can 
be extended to include actors other than governments.  Oates argues that gov-
ernments of sub-federal units, when faced with reciprocal spillover pollution, 
will have incentives to cooperate in order to manage the costs of this kind of 
pollution.  The NEG-ECP case suggests that similar incentives may exist for 
non-state actors to regulate where there are reciprocal economic effects that 
result from the regulation of pollution.  As previously explained, Hydro Que-
bec and private power companies in New England states are motivated to 
push for regional pollution measures in order to gain a competitive advantage 
in the region or to ensure that regulation by any single state does not give an 
advantage to competitors in other states in the region.  The relevant pool of 
actors who respond to spillover effects therefore extends beyond govern-
ments. 
In conclusion, the NEG-ECP can be the source of novel insights for ad-
ministrative law scholars.  Instrument choice theorists tend to assume that 
state actors deploy regulatory instruments either by producing them directly 
or by entering into agreements with other actors who produce them.88  The 
NEG-ECP case suggests a third possibility.  Rather than being selected by the 
state, certain regulatory instruments can emerge as effective when different 
networks of policy actors interact with one another.  The data generated by 
the Ouranos consortium became an effective regulatory instrument when it 
was passed from the network of researchers in the consortium to the network 
of policy makers and analysts in the NEG-ECP.89  The regulatory instrument 
did not come into being at the express bidding of the state, but rather emerged 
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as an effective tool when members of different networks with shared interests 
in climate regulation came into contact with one another and translated the 
information into policy action. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has pursued two broad goals.  First, it has attempted to 
demonstrate how network theory, the theory of global administrative law, and 
theories of environmental and non-positivist federalism, find support in on-
the-ground developments in administrative federalism and transnational regu-
lation.  The Canadian federation and the NEG-ECP conference were the case 
studies for these developments, and the domestic example provided a national 
analogue for the transnational case.  A subsidiary objective has been to 
counter a positivist conception of international law, and while the non-
positivist position argued in this Article is an alternative to the dominant posi-
tivist account, this Article does not intend to argue that the non-positivist 
position can replace that dominant account.   
Second, this Article has attempted to demonstrate how a recent instance 
of transnational environmental regulation may advance theorists’ work and 
may suggest future directions for policy makers.  It is this Article’s aim to 
contribute to the collective work of the group of scholars who gathered in 
Luxembourg.  I hope that this Article may prove to be a useful contribution to 
the growing literature on comparative administrative law, and that more spe-
cifically, the analysis of the case study in Part IV will prove to be a useful 
contribution to the collective discussion of the conference theme of transna-
tional administrative law.  Finally, the case study treated in Part IV suggests 
that transnational networks of scholars can be effective vectors of ideas about 
administrative structures and policies.  The participants in this discussion 
group and this research network are an important node in the emerging global 
network of administrative law scholars, and it is a delight to contribute, in 
however small a way, to this transnational project.   
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